In January 2019, the Nickerson Post, a banquet hall in Quincy, Massachusetts, hired Paul Keenan and Christopher Bulger to provide private police detail at a concert. Keenan was chief of the City’s police department, and Bulger was an officer in that department. That evening, the Nickerson Post was over capacity and in “complete chaos.” The venue overserved alcohol to attendees, and was host to fights, disturbances and other assaults. Bulger was alleged to have done nothing in response to the overservice or violent behavior, failing to remove the individuals responsible and ultimately abandoning his post early and leaving the venue without any security.
After he left, a man named Christopher McCallum attempted to intervene in a fight between patrons and suffered fatal injuries, dying the following day.
McCallum’s estate brought suit against the City, Keenan, and Bulger, alleging negligence, wrongful death, wanton and reckless conduct, and loss of consortium. The City, Keenan, and Bulger moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. However, the Court did not dismiss the claims against the officers in their individual capacity, reasoning that the question of whether they were acting in the scope of their employment was a question for a jury. The officers appealed this determination.
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals reversed the decision with respect to Keenan’s personal liability but affirmed the decision on Bulger’s liability. Though the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) immunizes public employees against claims for negligence, gross negligence, and reckless conduct, it does not immunize public employees from liability for conduct outside the scope of their office or employment.
“Here, the allegations do not plausibly suggest that Keenan acted outside the scope of his office. All his alleged conduct was ‘in furtherance of’ his duties as chief of police. The complaint alleges that Keenan inadequately trained officers assigned to details at private establishments, failed to promulgate policies and procedures on detail assignments, and did not investigate or discipline officers who abandoned their assigned posts. Keenan is not alleged to have done work he was not hired to perform by the City, acted outside the authorized limits of his role as chief, or been motivated entirely by a purpose other than serving the City.”
“As for Bulger, we conclude that the allegations support a plausible inference that Bulger’s allegedly tortious conduct occurred outside ‘the scope of his office or employment.’ The plaintiffs sued Bulger for his acts and omissions while working essentially as a security guard at a private establishment. Even though the complaint does not specify who paid Bulger or assigned him his duties at the Nickerson Post, it alleges sufficient facts to infer that he was being paid separately for his work on the detail and that his duties there were distinct from his authorized duties as a police officer. It can also be inferred from his alleged indifference to the overservice of patrons and unruly behavior at the Nickerson Post that he was motivated to serve the commercial interests of that establishment, not the interests of the police in maintaining public order and safety.”
The Court emphasized that the ruling did not in any way bear on its view on the merits of the issue of the claim against Bulger, but only served to clarify the extent to which questions regarding the scope of Bulger’s employment “will continue to be a critical issue as the plaintiffs litigate their claims against him,” at either the summary judgment or jury deliberation stages.
Doyle v. City Quincy, 104 Mass. Ct. App. 761 (Mass. Ct. App. 2024).